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Access to Justice and Civil Forfeiture Reform: 
Providing Lawyers for the Poor and Recapturing 
Forfeited Assets for Impoverished Comrnunities 
Lo uis S. Rulli ' 
Since its incep tion, the national legal services program has faced seri-
ous political opposition and formidable challenges to fulfilling the prom-
ise of equal access to justice for the nation 's poor.' The 104th Congress 
presented legal services programs with th eir most difficult challenges to 
date: reduced federal funding by almost o ne-third, th e larges t single-year 
funding reducti on in the history of the p rogram,2 and sweeping restric-
tions imposed upon the activities of lega l se rvices lawyers.' With such 
dramatic changes as a backdrop, Yale Law School co nvened the first an-
nual Arthur Liman Colloquium' to bring together legal se rvices lawyers, 
private a ttorneys, and members of the acade my to examine the futur e of 
civil legal services to th e poor. 
Law schools were appropria te ly included in this challenge . T hey we re 
urged to tak e concrete steps to respond to the growing unmet legal needs 
of th e poor by, among other things, adop ting ma ndatory public service 
programs in law school ,5 expanding clini ca l programs to otTe r law stu-
i· Prac tice Assoc ia te Professor o f Law. Universi ty of Pcnnsy!van i~1 Law Sch ool. T he aut hur 
is gratd ul to i'vl a tth..:w !vlcDonald. Lincoln F rakes. and Gabri ·: b Femc·n ia . th r..: c cxcci lc: nt Ia\\· 
students. fo r the ir v:.JIU~ibk assistance . 
See. e.g .. Vice -Presiden t Spiro T. Agnew. Whur 's Wrung <vir lillie !. ega/ Scr t ias Cu rpum -
lion, 58 A.B.A. J. Y3l) ( l'J72): No te:. Th e Legal Ser vices Corpor111ion: Cu noiling l'olilicu/fl/[er -
fc rencc.8 l YALEL..I. 2:> 1 ( I'J7l). 
2. \Vhik the 10-l th ConQress did not succeed in c lim ina tinl! cdl fcJe rcd fundin<! to th e: Lc l!a l 
Serv ices Corporat i<m. fc: dcr7ll fund ing wa s reduced from S-115 ~11i l liun w just S27~ milli on. T he 
prev ious la rgest single year reduction in fed eral fun ding lh::cur rc: d h.:l\\·ccn fi SL\ d ~·c~Hs ..J..,9 ;-) t an d 
l <J82 when federa l funding was reduced bv one-fourt h . 
.3. Congress imposed sc:, · ~ re res trict ions which struck at the core uf the: in clcpcndcnce of 
legal se rvices lawvc: rs. Among other thin gs. the restrict io ns prohibit ad min istr ~ ttive an d kg isla-
tiv·co advoca cv. c h ~il k ngcs to welfare reform legisl at ion and pol icies . rcprc:;c: ntation of imm i-
gran ts who are rwr la\\'ful permanent residents. litigation on beha lf uf pri sone rs. rcprc:sent~ltio 11 
of publ ic housin g res idents th re ate ned wi th eviction based upun a lleged drug ac tivitv. prohibi-
tion of class act ion sui ts and claims for a tto rney"s fees. Sec Omni bus Consolid ated P.csc iss ions 
and Appropriati ons Act o f 19'J6 . Pub. L 104-1 3-1. 11 () St:lt. U2l (I 'Nil) I Bud~c t Act of 1 <J')6 . * 
:ili.J(a )): sec ulso LS C reg ul ati ons implementing restrictions. 61 Fed. R.eg. -1 ! 9hil (Aug 13. 1 ')96) . 
I 'J% \V L -15~-l.J'J. n I Fed . Reg. -157 -10 (Au g 29. 1996). 19% \VL .J:->'JS l3 
-1 . The Colloqu ium was he ld March 5-6. 19'J8. and vv·as co->pnns,J recl lw the Ya ie La" 
Schoo l Public Serv·ice Program and the Jerome K Frank Lega l Serv·icc:s O r~ ;:ni z :H i on. 
5. Fur exam ple. the University of Pennsylvania Law Schnnl req uires ikll ;\II student s pe r-
fo rm 71) huurs of publ ic service \IS a condi tion of gradua tio n. 
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dents experienti al le arning opportunities while sa tisfying the lega l needs 
of impove rished clients, an d pe rforming needed resea rch and coordina-
tion functions in th e wake of fede ral defunding of lega l services back-up 
centers.6 Above all, law schools were expected to integrate strong pro fes-
siona l responsibi lity values into all aspects of th e established curriculum. 
so that future lawyers would appreci ate their unique role in providing ac-
cess to justice for all Americans and in employing the rule of law to rem-
edy pervasi ve discrimination based upon povcrty.7 
In short, th e colloquium called upon each of its participant const itu-
encies to join in new and innovative ways to insure that lega l services 
programs succeed well into the future despite current adversities. The ur-
ge ncy of this message was heightened by the knowledge that a serio us 
const itutional challenge to the na tion 's second largest funding so urce for 
civil legal services- the Interest On Lawyer Trust Acco unt program 
( IOLT A)'-was bri efed and argued, and awaiting decision by the U. S. 
Supreme Court." 
As constituent groups shared with each o ther impress ive innovations 
from their loca l communities. there was an opportunity to refl ect upon 
the many ways tha t law students enro lled in clinical courses were already 
contributing to this mission and how, through in creased coordin ation 
with legal services and pro bono communities, th ese efforts could be 
strengthen ed in the future. Two examples from curren t clinical initiat ives 
at the Unive rsity of Pennsylvania Law School came quickly to mind. 
First clinica l faculty sho uld express ly coordin a te their case accep-
tance polici es with the prio rities of lega l se rvices programs so th a t fa culty 
give grea te r emphasis to cases th at lega l services lawye rs a re prohibited 
from handling und er current federal res trictions. For example. legai 
ser vices lawyers employed in programs that receive federal funding may 
6. The Budget Ac t uf ILJ9il e liminated federal fundir. g to a ll I ll of the LSC s Nat iun a \ Sup· 
r•ort Cente rs. a ll 50 State S upport Units. LS Cs five Regi,1na l Tra ini ng C en ters. s i\ C \LK 
un it s. a nd th e :\'a ti ona l Ckarin~ho usc for Lc~a\ Ser\'ices (publisher of the Clearinglwusc Re· 
, ·ie,,·. the po,·erty law jo urnal for kg•li ser\'iccs \aw\'er s). 
7. Form e r Pres ident J imm,· Ca rte r. in a recen t comm e nceme nt add ress at the U n i,·ersit y of 
Pe nn sy lva ni a. stated that ·· the wurst discrimination on eart h is ric h people agai nst poor pc·upk. 
This is no t a d c liber•lte d iscr iminatiun. l t" s not filled with h:Hred o r animos it Y. but it perm ca tcs 
the human race .·· Comn1.:nce mcnt Address dc \i v<: red on May l S. !99S in Phi l:1de lphia. reprint<',/ 
in part . \VIw are rl1e Rit:h Peupie' . PH I LA. \ ~()UIR.F. R. May 26. 1998. at A J3. 
8. IO LTA prog rams genera te mo re tha n S lUlJ mill io n annua ll v for civil legal sc r,· iccs . St'e 
Brief of Amic i Cur iae in Suppnrt o l the Petit ioners at ''' l l. Phillips,._ Washington Le ga l Foun-
dat ion. ] l)l)S \VL 309070 (U.S llJLJ:':) (l\u. \16 -157,~) ( Brief available at \9LJ 7 WL -+711~(!11). 
LJ. On June 15. l9<JS. the U.S. Supreme Court held. bv a na rrow 5-4 m a rgi n. th<tt int e res t 
incom e ge nerated bv fu nds held in IOLT.'\ •tccou nts is tht: p riva te p rope rtY of the owner llf th e 
pr incipaL Howc,·cr. the Court exprc>> iv took no view on whc· ther \OL T 1\ fu nds constitute :1 
t•tking under Fifth Amendment j uri sprlllkncc nr \\' heth er just compensation is due. These: i:<s ucs 
we re remanded to the Fifth Ci rcuit f,ll. further co nside ration. See Phillips, .. Washin gton LL:g•tl 
Fo un d:tti o n. I I S S Ct. i'J~5 ( ILJ% ). 
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no longer represent public housing tenants facing eviction based upon 
alleged drug activity. !(I Without legal services lawyers to help, many fami-
lies will wrongfully lose subsidized housing and be unable to pay for 
comparable housing in the private market. The results will be disastrous: 
some families will become homeless and be forced to live in shelters or 
on the streets: others will split up and assign children to overcrowded 
homes of family relatives; still others will move into uninhabitable and 
unsafe apartments. Obviously, clinical programs can play a vital role in 
safeguarding the rights of tenants who otherwise would receive no legal 
help at all. 
Clinical programs will also benefit from undertaking these cases. 
They are excellent teaching cases for law students because they involve 
extensive client and witness interviewing, sophisticated factual investiga-
tion and development of evidence, case planning, negotiation and in-
court representation. Perhaps more importantly, law students must leave 
sheltered law school environments to visit public housing projects where 
they directly confront the face of poverty, sometimes for the first time. 
and learn how a growing underclass of American society struggles for its 
daily survival. As the legal process unfolds, clinical supervisors help stu-
dents to wrestle with agency incompetence and maliciousness. opposing 
counsel intransigence. and the rigidity and unfairness of a national ''one 
slrikc·· policy" that purports to justify the eviction of a iong-tirne tenant-
grandmother for the a lleged sins of her adult grandson. 1' Students learn 
the importance of having a lawyer at one's side in administrative and ju-
dicial systems that are intimidating and unforgiving (and th ey rightfully 
q uestion vvhy Congress has taken away an indigent tenant's lawyer just 
when legal help is needed most). Students observe the powerful rok that 
lawyers play in the drafting of policies and administrative regu lations and 
in the counseling ol governmental clients when vital interests are at stake. 
T hese are powerful lessons not readily learned in the classroom. 
iiJ. Sec Budget Act of lli<J6. ~ ::i0-+(a)(l7i: sec ui1D LSC Interim Regulation. hl F~ d. Rc". 
-+l~'h) (,..\.ugusll3, 19Sl6). 
!I. Notice P!H 'Xi-In (I·!A ) issued on A pril 12. l'i%. bv the U.S. Department of llousing 
~'i nd U rh~tn DL'vcloprncnt on tlh::: ~ubjc:ct of --on e strike and you·re uut" ~cr<::cning and ~:: v ictl o i1 
guidc:l)ne:s fur public housing ~luthoritics. Th,_: notice provides guidanc:.:: for stricter ='LTC-.:iling 
~l!:d c\'ictiun policiL·s fo!]o\ving the President"s announccn1ent on ~vlan:h 2S. ! 0Y6. ()f :1 ··on~_· 
strike and you·rc out"' policy. 
1:2. The '"tlfk' strike .. pulicy \\·urks injustice in In any Lunily cuntcxts but pcrh:tps mtY·_.i. fr;_·-
qu•-.:ntly '.vhcn muthcr::.: and grandmothers. who have lived rc~ponsib!y in pubiic hou~ing fut· 
many years. Llce eviction because uf the alleged wrongdoing of their aJult childrc:n ur ~rand ­
children. Polici es such as these r{tis,_: in1purtant legal and non-kgal que sti ons that shc:uld b·-.: 
·~·lc>Sd~ L'X cunincd \\ ith c1ctual experience. nut cmly by future public interest bwycrs but a i ~ u by 
future curpor~He <.tnd government Lt\Yycrs \Yho \\'ic!d consickr~1 hl e influL·ncc u\·cr the fon11~1tiun 
of pul-dic policy. 
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In addition to providing representation in restricted cases, law school 
clinical programs should also assist legal services programs by identifying 
unrestricted cases that pose potential loss of shelter, income, or safety to 
indigent clients, but which historically have not received legal help from 
the local legal community. In such areas, the rights of the poor are par-
ticularly vulnerable because administrative and judicial proceedings rou-
tinely take place without the scrutiny of lawyers. For example, the clinical 
program of the University of Pennsylvania Law School has undertaken 
representation in a limited number of civil forfeiture cases in which the 
homes of indigent families are at stake . These cases provide law students 
(and faculty) with an unobstructed view of how poor people often lose 
their most important asset-their homes-without any assistance of 
counsel to safeguard their interests against erroneous government intru-
sion. The poor are literally driven onto the streets or into overburdened 
city shelters creating higher tax burdens on the general community, while 
the proceeds from the forced sale of their homes go to enrich law en-
forcement agencies. 
These cases allow students to witness the harsh consequences of puni-
tive forfeiture statutes that permit the exercise of enormous police power 
but which fail to provide adequate safeguards against wrongful govern-
mental action. Without legal representation, the scales of justice are 
grossly unbalanced, providing students with an experience that dramati-
cally contrasts with their classroom study of appellate cases in which all 
litigants appear to be represented by experienced counsel who skillfully 
argue the finer points of law to their clients ' advantage. There is sim ply 
no hiding the fact that the adversarial system doesn't work as it should 
when disadvantaged and unsophisticated individuals are forced to stand 
alone in defending their property against superior governmental re-
sources. Once this genic is out of the bottle , If can never go back in. T he 
hope is that the experience transforms students into enthusiastic advo-
cates for a just legal system that serves the needs of the powerless as we ll 
as the powerful. 
Clinical involvement in cases such as these also permits law schools w 
fulfill their historic role of identifying and writing about needed legal re-
form. While limited in number. the experiences gained from representing 
indigent homeowners in state civil forfeiture proceedings and observing 
others who proceed without counse l demonstrate that overall forfeiture 
reform is seriously overdue. The balance of this Paper calls for three spe-
cific changes in the civil forfei ture system intended to achieve measurab le 
progress in balancing the important interests at stake in these proceed-
ings: court-appointed counsel for indigent property owners ; detailed. 
public accounting of all assets forfeited annually to law enforcemen t 
510 
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authorities; and redirection of not less than fifty percent of forfeited asset 
funds from law enforcement agencies to the creation of special services 
districts in high poverty communities, so that drug prevention and com-
munity empowerment services, including free civil legal services to the 
poor, can be purchased for community benefit. 
Civil asset forfeiture is based on the legal fiction that property-
homes, vessels, cars and even cash-can be found guilty of wrongdoing 
and thereby be subject to forfeiture to the government. 13 While there are 
many federal forfeiture statutes, 1' civil forfeiture became a weapon in the 
war against drugs with the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
15 
As amended, the Act provided for 
the forfeiture of controlled substances 16 and conveyances used to trans-
port controlled substances, 17 moneys and negotiable instruments, 1' and 
real propertiy used to facilitate violations. Civil asset forfeitures in-
creased enormously when Congress revised the federal drug forfeiture 
program to create this "surgical strike" weapon in the war on drugs."' The 
purpose of this change was to strike a fatal blow at drug traffickers by 
taking away their cars , boats, airplanes, homes, and cash, while simulta-
neously increasing the resources of the seizing agency. Once seized and 
forfeited, the property may be destroyed, retained for official usc by law 
enforcement agencies participating in the seizure and forfeiture, or sold. 
Proceeds from the sale of forfeited assets were formerly deposited in the 
general fund of the U.S. Treasury but now flow primarily to the Depart-
ment of Justice 's Asset Forfeiture Fund21 and the Department of the 
Treasury's Forfeiture Fund'' to be used for law enforcement purposes. ' ' 
As of June 30. 1990. the seized asset inventories of the two programs 
were valued at $1.167 billion and $389 million, respectively, totaling 
$1.556 billion in assets. After deducting for expenses estimated to be 
$55.4 million , the two programs netted a huge surplus. In fiscal year 1991 
alone , the Department of Justice Assd Forfeiture Fund reported income 
13. See H.R. Rep. No. lil'i-3:i8. Part I. at 20 (summarizing antecedents ol civil asse t lurlci-
turc as background materials fur rcpurt on Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act. H.R. llJ6:i). 
l-L Sec. e.g .. 18 US.C.) 2344 (c igarettes). 7 US.C. ~ 21:5o (gamecocks). 18 U.S.C. ~ 1l)li3 
(RICO \iolation property). 
1:i. 21 U.S.C. ~ 881(a). 
11i. Sec21ljSC~8i:ll(a)(l). 
17. See21US.C.~1-JS1(~)(4). 
IS. See21 U S.C. ~ 001(a)(6) (llJ7S). 
I'!. Sec 21 U S.C.~ :-l81(a)(7) (1LJ:S-l). 
2U. See. e.g .. Mich~k M. Jochn~r. Fru111 FiClion ru Facr: The Suprc111c Cuur(s Rc-Ftoluoriun 
of Cit·i/ A.1se1 hnj~irure Law1. :-\2 I I.L. B.J. 51i0 ( ll)94 ). 
21. 28 U.S.C !:i 52-l(c)(-l ) . 
22. 31 U S.C. ~ 9703. 
23. See 2S U .S. C.~ 52-l(c)( 1 ). 
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of $658 million and expenses of $118 million, netting a surplus of $464 
million.24 
State and local law enforcement agencies can receive a portion of for-
feited assets in return for cooperating with the Department of Justice and 
Customs Service in seizure and forfeiture cases. The amounts of shared 
funds have also increased significantly and state and local law enforce-
ment authorities have increasingly relied upon shared assets for their 
budgetary operations.'; In addition, individual states have adopted their 
own civil forfeiture laws modeled upon the Uniform Controlled Sub-
stances Act.2" For example, in 1988 Pennsylvania enacted legislation27 
providing for the loss of property rights to the Commonwealth for viola-
tions of the state Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic 
Act.2' The state law directs that the district attorney and the state attor-
ney general utilize forfeited property or proceeds therefrom for the pur-
pose of enforcing the provisions of the same Act.
29 
In recent years. the civil asset forfeiture program has attracted grow-
ing criticism. Since the program is civil in nature, it does not contain the 
constitutional safeguards mandated in criminal cases and it places prop-
erty owners at risk for loss of their property without ever being convicted 
or even charged with a crime."' As a result, commentators have charged 
that the use of forfeiture has become too widespread and that the war on 
dr ugs has become a ··war on the Constitution. ''' 1 
The public is also genuinely concerned that the government's strong 
pecuniary interest in civil forfeiture creates a potential conflict of interest 
that threatens to distort valid police goals, thereby encouraging law en-
forcement officers to maximize reven\1e at the expense of crime preven-
tion." A former D epartment of Justice Chief responsible for the Asset 
Forfeiture Section stated that the department's "marching orders" were: 
:24. Sec Alison Roberts Sulomon. Dmgs uwl Mnnev: f-/l!lv Successfiil fs rl1e Sei;ure and For-
tcill!re Progrwn ar Raising Rn·e111te und Dislrihuling Proceeds". 42 E\!ORY LJ. ll4lJ. 1167 
( 1993). 
25. See id. at ll 74. 
26. See Solomon. sul'ra no k 24. at 11 t-:0. 
27. Controlled Subqances Forfeiture Act. 4.2 PA. C.S.A. ~ 6tlll 1-61-:02. 
2S. Act of April 14. 1'.172. P. l. 233. N u. 64. 35 P.S. ~ 7011-1 Ill er seq. 
29. 42 PA. C.S.A. ~6SOl(c) - (hJ. 
30. For example. a 1993 study in Arizona found that three-fourths of those who lost prop-
erty in Arizona police seizures were never accused of any wrongdoing. and more than $4 mil -
lion in cash was seized from people neve r charged with a crime. Eric Miller. 0 PS ro Close Fur-
((,irure Unir. Dirccror Nures l'o renriol Con/?icrs. ARIZ. REPUflLI C. Feb. 13. 1997. at B I . 
. 11. See. e.g .. Solomon . . \. llflr<l mste 24. at 1150. 
32. See Erik Cirant Lun a. Ficrion Frumps Innoc ence: The /J ennis Cuurr"s Consriruriunal 
l!u use Of Cards. 49 STA"i. L RE v . 409. -132 ( llJlJT): see also Eric Blumenson & Ev:1 Nilsen. l'u-
licing j(!l Prujlf· Till' Dmg \Vur"s llidden Econ o111ic Agenda. 65 U. CI!J. L REV. 35. Sh-84 
( 1998) . 
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·'Forfeit. forfeit , forfeit. Get money . get money, get money:··· A 1990 
memo from the Attorney General admonished U.S . A ttorn eys to in-
crease the volume of forfe itures in order to meet the Department of Jus-
tice 's annual budget target.
14 
In addition , there is deep concern that current forfeiture law vests un-
fettered discre tion over the expenditure of large sums of public moneys 
in the hands of unelected officials,
15 
and permits expendi tures unrelated 
to law enforcement objectives without appropriate public accountabil-
ity. '(> Cynicism and public distrust have bee n heightened by highly publi-
cized instances of abuse. " 
These legitimate concerns signal that the drug asse t forfeiture pro-
gram. while well-intended and undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the 
war on drugs, is in dire need of legislative reform at all levels." 
I. COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL 
Forfei ture actions filed under th e Pennsy lvania Controlled Substances 
Forfeiture Acr'" are civil cascs,
4
" but in practice they closely resemble 
criminal proceedings. The cases are brought in the name of the Com-
_)_) . Luna. supro note ~1 2. at -+33 11.l Y0 . 
. '4. !d. at 43 3. n.l'l'l: see also United States v. James Da vid Good Rea l Prope rl y. 510 U.S . 
43 . 5h. n.2 ( 1'1'13) (quoting Executi,·c O ffice for Uni ted States A ttorn~vs . 3S United Sta tes At-
torncv 's Bulletin I ~() ( DOJ 1'190)). 
35. See Edd ie O lsen . . V.J. Prowcutor Sd~n OJ/ r or/i:itlll't:S. PHIL .. \. 1:\0 L' IRE R. June IS. 
1 '}9~. at A I (q uoting a State Sena to r who contends tha t county government-:md not a prosecu-
tor appuintcd bv th e gove rnor-should decide how hundreds of thousands uf public dollars are 
spen t). 
3G. A mong th e questi oned uses of incn:ascd forfeiture funds by the County Pros~cu tor 
we re the purchases of two $ ll.IJOIJ h ~1ckclrops used for the Co untv Prosc:c utur 's news co nfer-
ences. s~e id. 
37. Sa . e. g .. H.R . RF.P. i\n . lli 5-3~S . Pa rt l. a t 23-27 (stories o! Wi llie Jones ~111d Bill \' 
:VIunnerlyn . two \\'itncsses at .ludiciarv Committee hear ings): see uf.w Mich ae l lsikotf. Dmg 
/(aids Net Mu ch \lulunhle l'ropat\'-, \nd Legal Upmur. WASH. POST. Apr. l. !'I'll. at AI 
(report ing the: fede ral seizure o r tine:.: fr ate rnit y ho us~s at th<: Uni,·ers ity o l Vi rginia with est i-
mated ,·:tl u..: of s I mill ion for the cunfisca ti on o r SC \'C ra l hundred dollars \\'Orth o r drugs): Lunct. 
supra note 32. at 432 n.l94 (notin g that law enforcem ent personne l use se ized te levisions and 
sterccb in the ir offices) and ~ll 433 n.1'}5 (nut ing that the distri ct attmn cv in Suffo lk Countv. 
'Jew Yo rk. dri ves a sei zed RMW 735i) : So lomon. supm note 24 . a t ll 7 l n.l 33 (describi ng a 
CiAO audi t that cli sco,·c rcd that'' DEA fie ld office had com·e rt ecl curi o cabinets and Norman 
Rock\\e il fi gurines for official use) and at ll 7l n.UI> (not ing th at in sun1e c:1ses the DE A pl aced 
items in to o ffi cial usc with ou t e\·e r process ing the fo rf.:i tt: d items): Platte . DulJ:v DitTrted US. 
Dmg-Sci;urc Funds to Seacr Accounl Slwri((. L..-\. T I ~ IES. Nove mber l. lY90 (reporting that 
drug seizure fund ,; of more than $30U.OOU were not deposited in the co unty trcas urv and . ac-
cord ing to news accounts. were diverted to a secre t sh.: riff·s accoun t ). 
3S. In an cxcclknt art icle on the subject o f civi l forfei tu re. :lt.lthors 13 lumenson an d Nilsen 
conclude that while the m:lss i,·c: out pou rings o f money and effort have produced record num-
be rs of drug seiZU I'c'S. asset for feitures and prosecut ions. b\· mor.: mea ningful mea sures the drug 
wa r hc1s bee n cm •"xtrau rdin c1ry failure . Sa 131umenson & 'J ilsen . supra note .'2. at 37. 
3'! . 42 PA. Cuc;s ST.-'. I .-\':N. ~~ h:-l Ul-ll2 ( Weq Jl)97 ). 
-~0. Sec Cum nwnl\'c'~li th 1·. \ \ in ~ a it F:mm. (il)(J :-\.2d :222 ( P:1. 1997 ). 
- 1 -, 
) L-, 
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monwea lth of Pennsylvania" 1 and are prosecuted by th e local district at-
torney 's office."c In Philadelphia, forfe iture hearings are held in the 
C rimin al Justice Center, a newly constructed high-rise courthouse , spe-
cially designed to efficiently process the large numbe r of crimin al cases 
arising each year in a maj or urban center. All individuals entering the 
building are e lectronically searched for weapons before entering a bank 
of elevators which deliver them to courtrooms on upper tloors. The ele-
vators ope n to crowded hallways where prosecutors, defense lawyers and 
uniformed po lice officers sc urry to find the courtrooms in which their 
cases will be called. 
Forfeiture cases are assigned to Co urtroom 501. Once inside the 
courtroom, cases are called from a list. They are prosecuted by the same 
assistant district attorney and tried by the same assigned judge, subject 
only to infrequent rotation. Scores of indigent citizens, disproportion ately 
people of color, sit on benches toward the back of th e courtroom waiting 
for their names (or descriptions of their propert ies) to be call ed aloud by 
the clerk of the court. The prosec utor an d court staff do most of the 
ta lking, pausing frequently to inquire abo ut the prese nce of police offi-
cers expected to test ify in cases appearing on the co urt list. Most of the 
time, however. cases are simply continued to new tri a l dates months into 
the future. In the interim , private property seized by law en force ment 
age ncies rema ins with in th e exclusive custody and cont rol o f the dist rict 
attorney's office. ! 
It is clear tha t forfeiture cases enjoy the full resources and powe r of 
the sta te . U nlike civi l courtrooms in which the presid ing judge exercises 
dominant cont rol , forfeiture court appears to revolve around the ac tions 
of the prosec uto r. Cases proceed o r await new hearing da tes seemingly a t 
the wish of th e prosecutor. P roperty owners confused by the court' s pro-
ced ures direct the ir inquiries to her. Except for an occasional con tested 
bearing, the judge's role appears limited to approving rescheduled hear-
ing dat es that have been mutually agre ed upon by th e prosecutor and too 
sched uling clerk. \Vit ho ut knowing more. a casua l observer wou ld almost 
ce rt ainly identify forfe iture co urt as a criminal co urtroom. It is a confus-
ing and in timid ating place. 
On closer observat ion , however, the civil nature of the courtroom be-
comes more evident. T here are no public defenders present and on ly oc-
casionally does a private defense lawyer enter the cou rtroom. Indigent 
pa rties are alone. confused by the process and unsure o f wh at is expected 
of them. T hey passive ly wait for long periods o f time whi le retaining 
4 1. Sn · 42 P,\ CCJ 'JS. STAT. Ac; ~. ~ 6802(a) (West llJ'.17). 
42 . S~e -+2 P .-'.. C'CJ ~S. ST.\T. A'J". * 6S02(b) (\\'es t 1'.1'.17 ). 
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hope tha t they will regain their property once they tell their sto ries to the 
judge. 
Indigent property owners come to forfeiture co urt with o ut an atto r-
ney for many reasons. Some do not know that they may seek legal assis-
tance or even that a lawyer might be helpful to them in such a proceed-
ing. Unlike other civil actions commenced with a formal complaint and a 
notice to defend 13 that informs defendants in English and Spani sh where 
they can go to obtain legal he lp, forfeiture proceedings are begun by a 
petition'" and an abbreviated notice which states simply that a default 
judgment may be entered if a time ly response is not filed. 45 The district 
attorney's office does not attach voluntarily th e more de tailed notice to 
defe nd. 
In any event, indigent property owners lack the ability to pay a lawyer 
and are therefore dependent entirely upon the availability o f free legal 
assistance in the local community. However, the public defender 's office 
will no t represent th em because these are not criminal proceedings, and 
the local legal services program, already se rio usly under-funded and fac-
ing exploding cli ent demand, cannot staff forfeiture cases even if they fall 
within the program 's ever-narrowing case acceptance priorities. The pri-
vate bar 's pro bono program wo uld like to he lp , but also is overtaxed 
with refe rrals for family law and child disability cases. 
The truth is that civil forfe iture cases fa ll be tween the cracks of th e 
public defender and legal services de livery systems. Indige nt homeown-
ers must fend for themselves, too often with disas trous res ults. It is no t 
difficult to understand why. 
Many low-income homeowners who come to fo rfeiture co urt are li v-
ing on th e street or in homeless shelters because their homes have al-
ready been seized by law enforcement authorities without ad vance noti ce 
or an opportunity to make alterna tive living pl ans. Mere ly surviving in 
such a hostile environment consumes the ho meowner 's tim e and ener-
gies . T his leaves th em little capacity, time , or mo ney to pre pa re and fi le 
re sponsive pleadings or to develop factual ev id ence in suppor t of th e ir 
claims. It is unreasonable to beli eve that clients ca n mount a credible de-
fen se under such adverse conditions. 
The civil practice clinic at the U nive rsity of Pennsylvani a Law Schoo l 
accepted its first drug-related civil forfeiture case when a single mother 
-U. See Pa. R.C.P. 10 18. 1. 
-14. Sl!e -12 P,\ CONS. STAT. AN N. ~ 6802( a) (Wes t 1Y97) . 
-1 5. See 42 P.-\ . CO:-<S. STAT. ANN . § 6802(b) (requi ri ng tha t the not ice stat<: the fol lo,,·ing: 
··Yo u arc: req uired to fil e an answer to this pe ti tion. sell ing forth yo ur ti tle in. and right to pos-
session of. said property with in 30 days from the se rvice he reof. and vou arc also noti fi ed lin t. if 
vou fa il to fil e s:1id answer. a defense of forfeiture and conde mnation ,,·ill be entered again st 
said proper ty.·"). 
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was thrust into the city's homeless shelter after her home was seized and 
the district attorney's office filed a petition seeking forfeiture of the 
house. The referral for help highlighted the need for access to counsel in 
such important matters. The Commonwealth Court, Pennsylvania's in-
termediate appellate court, had previously ruled in a case of first impres-
sion that an indigent property owner was entitled to counsel in civil for-
feiture cases under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amenclment.~6 While acknowledging that the clue process clause histori-
cally required appointments of counsel only in cases threatening the 
physical liberty of criminal defenclants,~7 the Commonwealth Court inter-
preted the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Lassiter v. Department of So-
cial Service/~ simply to create a presumption against appointment of 
counsel where liberty interests were not involved. In the Court's opinion, 
clue process protections might still require the appointment of counsel in 
appropriate cases when applying the factors enumerated by the Supreme 
Court in Mnthews v. Eldridge. ~Y 
\Nhile Pennsylvania courts require that an indigent parent be in-
formed of the right to free counsel in involuntary parental rights cases'" 
and certain paternity actions," the Commonwealth Court noted that no 
Pennsylvania appellate court, and only one non-Pennsylvania court. bad 
answered the precise question of whether an indigent property owner 
was constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel in civil forfeiture 
actions.' ' In a case known as United States\ v. 1604 Oceo!o, a district court 
in Texas concluded that because there was little likelihood of an errone-
ous deprivation of property, court-appointed counsel was not required 
where a property owner pled guilty to drug charges stemming from 
transactions involving the home. However. the Oceola court expressly 
limited its holding to the facts of that case, going to great pains to note in 
dicta that the interests of a homeowner in maintaining a family home 
upon which the mortgage had been paid for many years was substantial , 
and that the government's interest was less compelling where the home 
was not a present danger to society. The Court viewed the forfeiture as 
an attempt by government to exact an additional penalty upon the 
46. See Commonwealth v. S9.847.00 U.S. Currency. 637 A.2d 736 ( Pa. Commw. C t. ll!LJ4 ). 
-17. See id. at 742. 
-lS. 4~2 U.S.l:-i(l'JX1). 
4lJ. 424 l~ .S. 319 (1976). 
511. Sec In rc Adoption of R.l. 312 A.2d 601 (Pa. 1973). 
51. See Corra v. Coil. 451 /\. 2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1 'JS2). 
52. S ee United States v. 1604 Oceola. SU3 F.Supp ll'J-l (N .D. T ex 1'!92) (hereinafter 
0CC<>la). 
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homeowner'; for which the additional burden of appointing counsel 
would not be overwhelming. The Oceola court continued: 
Perhaps the most substantial imposition upon the government would be re-
quiring the Plaintiff to oppose an attorney in a complicated and abstruse field 
where the Plaintiff normally sxpects to meet only pro-se litigants struggling 
through the claimant process.· 
After the Oceola decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Austin v. 
U.S. 5' that the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment was ap-
plicable to civil forfeiture proceedings. The Commonwealth Court rea-
soned that the Austin holding would require a different result in Oceola 
because of the homeowner's increased likelihood of suffering an errone-
ous deprivation of property. Therefore, based largely upon the Austin 
holding. the Commonwealth Court concluded that court-appointed coun-
sel for indigent property owners was constitutionally required.5" 
On the strength of the Commonwealth Court's ruling, the clinic filed 
a motion requesting that counsel be appointed to represent the client. 
The hope was that a favorable ruling at the trial level would have the 
practical effect not only of insuring counsel in this case but also of leading 
to routine court appointments in all of the prose forfeiture cases awaiting 
adjudication. Unfortunately, the forfeiture judge decided not to grant any 
such motions until the State Supreme Court completed its review of the 
Commonwealth Courrs decision. 
The landmark decision of the Commonwealth Court was short-lived. 
In 1997. the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth 
Court and expressly adopted the Lassiter presumption that an appoint-
ment of counsel is not constitutionally required in civil cases that do not 
implicate a liberty interest.'' When applying the Mmhews v. Eldridge fac-
tors. the State Supreme Court found that the property interest at stake 
commanded a lesser level of clue process protection, while the govern-
ment's interest in deterring illegal drug activity by confiscating the profits 
therefrom was significant. The Court also found the risk of erroneous 
deprivation to be minimal and the burden to government of providing 
counse l Lo an entire class of claimants to be substantial.'' As a result , the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the 
)3. Scc Oceola. 8()3 F. Supp. at 11 <.J7. 
:i4. M 
:'5. )lllJ U.S. 602 (lLJ<.J3). 
56. See Commonwealth v. $LJ.:-;47 ()()U.S. Currency. 637 A.2d 736. 7-14--17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1'.19-1). 
)7. See Commonwealth v. $9.8-17.1ll! U.S. Currency. 70-1 A.2d 612 (Pa. 19'!7). The case did 
not raise the question of whether the governmental seizure of a L;milv home without advance 
notice or opportunitY fur the Lunilv to make alternative living plans. thcrehv sul1Jecting the 
familv to illlmclc."ncss. implic;ttcs a constitutionally protectecllibertv interest. 
S0. See iJ at G 16. 
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Fourteent h Amendment does not require the appointment of counsel to 
indioent claimants in forfeiture cases. 5" Courts in at least eight other 
0 
states have agreed that co urt-appointed counse l is not constitutionally 
. d 6U req L!lre . 
While court-appointed counsel appears not to be constitutionally re-
quired in civil forfeiture proceedings , it is clear that Congress and state 
legislatures may afford property owners greate r protection than what the 
constitution requires. Indigen t homeowners in particular have substantial 
interests at stake and do face a high likelihood of erroneous deprivation 
for the reasons previously discussed. In many such cases, homeowners 
may never be convicted of any offense and some may not even be 
charged with any wrongdoing. But, without counse l, they are likely to 
forfeit their property in uncontested act ions or in hastily prepared con-
tested actions where their pro se defenses offer little real hope of success 
against superior governmental resources.
61 
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act.6' sponsored by Representa-
tive Henry J. Hyde""' and introduced in the H ouse of Representatives on 
June 19. 1997, proposes important procedural reforms for federal forfei-
ture actions, including the appointm ent of counse l for indigent par ties in 
appropriate casesr·• The proposed Act provides as follows: 
(d) APPO I:>HtE '\T or- COL<'SE L. -- (l) If the: person filin g a claim is fi nan-
cially un ab le to obtain rep rese ntation by co unsel anti requests that counse l 
be appointcd. the co urt may appoint counsel to rep rese nt that perso n with 
re spect to the claim. In de termining whethe r to appoint cuunsel to re present 
the person filing the claim. the court sha ll ta ke into acco unt·--
(A) th e nature and value of th e property subj ect to fo rfe iture. in cludin g th e 
hMdship to the claimant from the lOSS o f the property sc: ized. CO!llp<tred tO 
the expense of appointing co unsel: 
5lJ. The Court did not reach th .: issue of wh.;th.; r co urt -<lppoi nkd counse l i,; rn a ncla t.:d hv 
the Pen nS\·[\·ania Constitu tio n. 51'~ id. a t Gl7. 
GO. Sec. e.g .. Resc:k v. State. 7U6 P2d 2S8 (A laska 1\185) (decli ning to est:~bli s h a right to 
cuunsc l but granting courts discretion to ;1ppoint counsel in fur fe iture proc.:cdin gs conducted 
pr im to criminal proceedings so th at the propert v owncr·s right against sel f-incrimin a tion can be 
protected): Peopk v. :530,000 Un ited Stat<:s Cu rrcncv . 35 Ca l. App. -l th 9.36 (Cal. C t. App. 
19lJ5 ): State v. Tuipuapua . 925 P.2d .311 ( Ha\1. 1990): Stat.: v. One 1'190 Gco l'vk tro. 88\f P. 2d 
\ lilJ ( Ida ho JY95): In rc 8 \y. -!56 N. W. 2d 195 (Iowa J'J90): Stat.; v·. Prcclka. 555 N.W. 2d 21!2 
(Iowa l lJl)6): Ve rgari v-. Lockh a rt. 545 i\.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y . . "'.pp. Div. 1989) : 1-vlorge nth:w v·. Gar-
ci a. l-lS !\lise. 2d 900.561 N Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990): Stak n ref. Eikc nbc rrv v. Frod-
crt.lJ2-l P.2d Y33 (Wash. Ct. App. ILJ96). 
61. It h;J s hcen suggested that the absence o f counsel is one of the primary reaso n;; vv-hy at 
least 80'Yo of civ il forfeiture cases are not chal lerH!ed s~e H.!-{. R EP. No. 105-35K. at 28-29 
( 19lJ7) . ~ 
G2. H.R. \965. 105 th Con g. (1997) . 
63 . u.S. House of Reprcsentaiives . Illinois (6th District ). Representative Hyde is Chair of 
the House Co mmittee on the .Judic iary. 
64. See H.R. 1965. ~ 2(cl) (Appo intm ent of Co unsel). 
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(B) the claimant's standing to conkst the forfeiture : anJ 
(C) wh e th e r the claim appears to be made in good faith o r to be fr ivo lo us. 
While this provision would not make court appointments of counse l 
automatic, it would take a major step toward insuring tha t co unsel is ap-
pointed in appropriate cases. U nfortunately , thi s proposed reform (and 
previous similar vers ions) has been pending for some time in Congress. r,; 
Unquestionably, the D epartment of Justice has undermined this reform 
effort by opposing court-appointmen ts in federa l forfe iture proceedings."" 
While the government's interes ts never go unrepresented in forfeiture 
proceedings , th e D epa rtment apparently be li eves that a proper ty owner's 
interes ts are adequate ly protected by the individual's potential ab ility to 
recover legal expenses in a successful action aga inst the United States 
under the E qual Access to Justice Act (EAJA)."7 
The Department's argument is plainly un convincing. Only court-
appointed counsel will ass ure tha t indigen t property owne rs have the 
he lp of a lawyer in all appropriate civil fo rfeiture cases and , most impor-
tantly , from the ear lies t stages of the proceed ings. In contras t, EAJA fees 
will a t best serve as a very limi ted financial in ducement for some private 
attorneys to get involved in selec ted cases, but only if an indigent prop-
e rty owne r is abl e to engage in a sea rch for a lawyer and th en is able to 
convince the lawyer to take on prot racted li tiga ti on for continge nt remu-
nerat ion under a fo rfeit ure statute that is strongly weighted in favo r of 
the govern ment. Eve n if a lawyer takes a case and wins it. EAJA fees still 
are not guaranteed. Instead, the government is likely to oppose a motion 
for EAJ A fees on the basis that the g:overnment's action was substan-
tially justified under the sta tute .
6
' Colla te ra l li tigation chall enging the 
lawye r's entitlement to EAJA fees ancl opposing the amount of compen -
sable ho urs will almost certai nly discourage private counsel from repre-
se nting indigent parties . If the avail ability of EAJA fees is an acceptable 
answer, why clo so many property owners go unrepresented? 
65. H .R. 1965 ( introduced o n June 19. 19'!7 and co-spo nsored hv onl\· 3 rcprcsc mat ivcs) is 
the most rccc n t ,·e rsio n of the proposed Civ il ,-\ :;,;c t Fo rfe iture Rc fu n n .-\ct proposed lw Re p re-
sent a ti ve H vde . P rior ve rs io ns inc lude H.R. lS35. l O:i th Ctmg .. int ruduccd o n Jun e· 10. l 'J'J7 with 
2lJ cosponsors: I-l.R. 19 IIi . lO-lth Cong .. imroducc:d on .J une 22 . 19')5 " ·ith 23 cosponsors: ;mel 
H .R. 2-1 17. 103rcl Cong .. introduce d on June 15 . IY'i3 with (1 2 cos ponsors. Se e ulso H.R. 33-17. 
103rcl Ccmg. (Asset Fo rfe iture Justice Act. introduced lw Repre senta tive Convcrs o n Octobcr 
22. IY93) 
6o. See Ci•·ii A sse/ Foi feiru re RefrJrJJJ , \cr: I fearing on I I. R. / 835 Be.fi ,re rhe Conu nince u n 
rhe .ltuliciun ·. 105 th Con g. Il l . 120 (1997 ). 
67. Sec id: see also Ci •'il Asscr Forf~iwrc 1\e!innt 1\ cr: !/eu ri11<; 011 // ./( N/15 Be/ine rite 
Conunirree "II rite .ludiciurv . J() .:f th Con g. 22LJ ( llJLJ6) . · . 
(JK. See. e.g .. United Sta te s v. Duugl;t s. 55 F.3d :i S-l (l i th C ir. llJlJ:i ): C re;Hi\ e E lectri c v. 
Lnited S ta tes . l 'J97 \VL 15 177'1 (N .D.N. Y. llJ'J7). 
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M oreover, in state forfeit ure proceedings where th e United Sta te s is 
no t a par ty, fe deral EAJA fees obviously are not available to indigent 
property owners. Only court-appointed coun sel in sta te proceedings offer 
indigent property owners any m eaningful chance of safeguarding vital in-
te rests . 
T he cost of providing court-appointed counsel can eas il y be p a id from 
funds deposited in the federal or state forfeiture asset fund (which ever is 
appropria te) without imposing any additional burden on taxpayers. To 
keep legal costs to a necessary minimum, co urt appointme nts co uld be 
mandatory in those cases in which an indigent family's hom e is at stake , 
and di scret io nary in all o ther cases. Courts can be aut horized to exercise 
tha t discretion in accordance with factors such as those proposed in the 
C ivil Asset Forfe iture Reform Act.
69 
Only by providing for the appoint-
ment of counsel in both state and federal forfeiture proceedings can the 
p ublic begin to have confidence that proper ty which is ultimate ly fo r-
feited to th e government actually belongs in a forfeiture asse t fund and 
that meri torious defenses possessed by o rdinary ci tize ns are not simply 
aba nd oned or drummed out because of superior governmenta l resources . 
I I. DETAIL ED Pl; BLI C ACCOUNTING OF FORFEITED A SSETS 
The public al so has a compelling interest in knmving thf precise na-
ture and va lue of private ly owned assets forfe ited each year to law e n-
fo rceme nt authorit ies. While fed eral law requires the A ttorney G e nera l 
to mak e an annual re port to Co ngress outlining the va lue of p rope rty 
lak en into the Fund,"' and the ending balance of the Fund and paym ents 
made to sta te and local law enforcement agcncies ,
71 
the public is not a f-
forded a meaningful understanding of the extent to which private prop-
erly is forfe ited eac h year. Congressional tes tim ony from law e nforce -
men t a uthorit ies reveals that amounts flowing into th e fed e ral F und a re 
verv significa nt
7
' Payme nts made to sta te and~loca l authorities by fed era l 
6lJ. The Rdu rm Act \\'Oui d require a court to take int o account: th e nature and' a lue o f the· 
propcnv su bjec t tL) foreclosure. includ ing the hardsh ip to the cl<iim ant from the luss o f the p rop-
~ rl\ sc·i zc d. compared to the expense of appo inting counse l: th ~ claim ant·s sta nding to contes t 
the fu rfeitu rc: and whe the r the clai m appea rs to be made in good faith o r to be fri vo lous. Sec 
H.R. 106.:1. 10.'ith Cong. ~ ::' (d) (1 LJ97). 
711 . 2~ li .S.C. ~ 52.J (c)( 1) create s the D epartment of Justice Assets Fo rfeiture Fun d to se ne 
as the reposi to rv o f a ll fo rfei ted pro pe rty se ized by the Dcpa rtm<: nt of Justi ce. 
7 1. 2~ L.S.C. ~ 5:2.J (c)( !i ) require;; the A tto rn ey G eneral to mak e this ann ua l repo rt. 
72. On J ulv 2:2 . 1 LJY6 . Stefa n D . Casse ll a. De puty Chie f. Asse t Forfei ture an d Mo n..:v Laun-
ckring Sec tion of the DqJartm.: nt o f Ju s ti c~. testi fi ed before th e House Com mit tee on the Jud i-
,_·i~H \ th at the Fund received $3 25 mi ll ion (prujccted) in FY 19LJG . S.J07.5 mi lli on in FY l LJ\1~ . 
S.'i-l<J .LJ mil liun in I LJ0.J. $)5:5.7 mill ion in FY 1903 . and $531 mi llio n in F't' 1'!92. See Ci1 if Asscr 
Fur/(-iwrc i?ef(mn Au: f! corim; on H.R. / Y/6 Hef"ure 1he Conunillce on lh ~ .ludicitiiT. iii.Jth 
Cc mg . -12. 2 16-2 17 ( 1lJLJ(i ). On J~illC 11. 1907. Mr. c:rssclla report ed to th e House ConH1;itte c O il 
!l~<c .iudicia n · th~ll !"i na! figures for FY l lJLJ(i amounted to $331\. 1 mi llion and th at fi rst qua rter 
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a uthorities through equitabl e sharing arc also sizable.
73 
Whi le to tal forfe i-
ture figures are reported to Congress pursuant to fe deral sta tute. the 
public has no deta iled information on the so urces of fo rfe ited property 
and most importantly on what impact th e se izure and forfe iture of pri-
va te property is having on local communities. 
Simil a rly, there a re onl y minimal reporting requirem ents fo r asse ts 
forfe ited under sta te forfe iture laws . For example , u nder Pennsylvania 
law, every county is required to provide an annual audit to the state at-
torney ge neral of all fo rfeited property and proceeds. '• Howeve r, this 
audit is not to be made public.
7
' The state a ttorney general is then re-
quired to submit an annua l report to the appropriations and judiciary 
committees of both houses of the legisla ture on the proceeds derived 
fro m the sale of fo rfe ited property and the use made of unsold forfe ited 
property.' '' B ut once again , the public is not given a de tailed report of the 
so urces of these fun ds, nor, more im portantly, a demographic summ ary 
of citizc ns77 adversely affected by forfe itures or an assessment of the im-
pact of fo rfe ited real prope rty on local communiti es.
7
' 
Detailed, public auditing on all levels will foc us increased national at -
tention o n th e vas t amo un ts of private proper ty fo rfeited each year to law 
enfo rcement agenCi es . While law enforcement acti vities are an obvious 
J'i;>.u rcs for FY 1997 were SilO mill ion. Civil A sser Forf~irurc Rc(r!m l Acr: /-!e(lrin g on H R. 1835 
B~f(,rc rile Connnirree un rl1e Ju diciurv . liJ:ith Con g. 11 6 ( l ')97). 
73. Cas,;c lla ·s tes timony re ports tha t payments made to sta te and loc;1l agencies :\mounted 
to 5 17'\ million (projected ) in FY l 'I'Jn. S228.7 milli on in FY llJ95. and $:>2X. lJ million in FY 
ILJ<J-f. ~:>2-f.' mill iu n in FY Jl)93. and S2-16.n mil liun in F Y 1992 . See l-I eu ring on HR. J<J in . 'IIJir'' 
nok 7 !. On .Jun e: 11.1 997 . Mr. Casse ll a repor ted to the House Comm ittee un th e Jud ici arv th <lt 
final ligures for FY llJLJii a mounted to 5163 .4 mi ll ion and that fi rs t quarter figures for FY l'J'J7 
,,·e re _>'\.1 mill ion. See Hearing on HR. IS35.supra note 7!. 
7-+. S,·c -12 P.-\ . CO\S. SnT. A\:'1. * 680 l( i) (\Vest 19'!7). 
7'\. Sn· id. 
76. See 42 P.\. CONS. STAT. ANN .~ 680l(j ) (Wes t Jl)l)7). T he attornev general is re qu ired 10 
<ld npt proced ure> a nd guide lines gove rning the re lease of in forma ti on lw local cou1Hi cs to pro-
t~ct the cnnfidcn ti al it v o f fmfc:itecl property o r procc·c:cl s used in ongoi ng drug cnlorc-: me nt by 
:IUtlwrities. 
77 . Oue >tions h:l\·c: bee n raise d as to whe ther the civi l forfeit ure program uses raci:illl· 
ha>c·d prufil ing :mel d ispro po rt ionately se izcs propertv from racial minoritic,;. S ec. e.g . . Soinnllln . 
.\llf>W no te 2-l. at 1185: Cil'il r\ sser Fur(eiw re RefrJrl/1 A cr: J-J earing on 1-J.R. I'Jif> Be((m· rile 
Conu ninee un rlu· .ludician·. l04th Cong. 290-29 1 ( 1996). 
7 ~. ln cases that in vo lve the se izure of a low-income fami lv" s house. it appea r,; th:ll tlK· 
building maY then be boa rded up fo r long peri ods of ti me. the rdw furth e r colll r ibuting tu urh:1n 
blic: ht and h i ~h ,·acancv ra tes in low-income nc i ~hborh oncls. It mav also become the :<ubject of 
br:ak-ins. va~1 cla l ism. ,; nd eve n ill ega l drug ac tiv ity bv i ndividua l ~ unconncctccl to the .house. 
L"e"l prosc cutu rs concc rk that asse t fo rfe itures convcv to the m a sma ll e mpi r•: uf mcKicq pn•p-
e rtic: s \\hich prove vc:ry di ffi cul t to dis pose of. See Cra ig R. McCoy. Sei~erl l fuu scs To u .~h ro 
Unload. Pi-ttL\. 1:\QL'mER . .Jan. 17. l<J92 . at Bl. The publ ic should know what f'nlpc rli cs a re 
" ·ithin the in ve ntory or law enforce me nt author ities and \\·hat steps arc being taken in :1 tinrel \· 
mannc: r tn return those propertic·s to producti ve use . Sec', e.g. . B:nba ra Barr•ct. Dnrg Tusk 
fun,· ·s Rc·wrds Cu 1erc·rlln· Vei l o(Sccrccv. Y OR I( DAt L\ · R ECOR D. Dec. 21. l 'llJ7. :I t,.\ !_ 1'!'17 
Wl.. l-l.':i .>21Jl (rcpurtin g u i1 the need for p.ubli c <1 Uc.liti ng of state forfeiture fu nds) 
.:JI _,_ 1 
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priority for the use of forfeited assets , they shou ld no longer be the only 
priority. 7" The current mandate to give virtually all forfeited assets to law 
enforcement age ncies evidences an ill-conce ived , legislative choice that 
emphasizes apprehension and punishment of drug activity to the virtual 
exclusion of prevention of drug use. The time has come to acknowledge 
that reducing the demand for drugs, especia lly among young Americans, 
is as important to the war against drugs as prosecuting offenders who 
vio late state and fede ra l drug laws . ~" 
III. RED IRECTION OF FORFEITED ASSET FUNDS 
\ 
Current legisla tive reform efforts in Congress focus primarily on pro-
cedural changes needed to improve the fairness of the forfeiture process. 
They do not, however, propose to reallocate forfei ture fundS.
01 
As proce -
dural reform remains on the horizon, '' hundreds of millions of forfeiture 
do llars continue to flow almost exclusive ly to law enforcement agencies. 
In contrast to the federa l modeL a handful of states have alloca ted 
some or all of the ir state forfeiture funds to purposes other th an law en-
fo rcement. California. for example . directs th a t fifteen percent of for fe i-
ture funds go to combat drug abuse and to dive rt ga ng activity whil e 
twe nty-four percent of the funds arc deposited in the state 's gene ra l 
fund -'' Indiana places control of for fe ited goods in the hands of the state 
board of pharmacy and directs that net funds from their sale go to the 
79 . In fact. sonk commen tators argue q u ite pe rsuasive ly tha t no funus shou lu go to law en · 
fo rcement age ncies a nd that a ll funds should go int o the ge nera l trca sur v. therebv e limina ti ng 
anv con fli c t o f interest crea tc·J by law e nfo rcem e nt· s pecuniary interes t in civil for fe itures. See. 
e.g .. Blurne nson & Nilse n. supro note 32. Ho\\"eve r. the chances o f such d ras ti c change in the 
alipca tio n of fo rfe iillre funds arc. a t best. e'\ trc melv re mote. Eve n the more mo dest concept. 
suggc:stc:d hy thi s :1rtick. of shari ng fo rfe it ure funds " ·as p rc vio uslv p roposed in The Asse t For-
fei ture J ustice r\c t int roduced by Representative Cunyc: rs in 1993 bu t it. too. fZ~ikd to win su tli · 
ci ent legislative suppo rt at that time. Sec I-!.R. 33.\7. J03d Con g .. * 15 ( 1993) . 
SO. See Melodv lvl. Heaps &. James :\ . Schwartz . Tu"w·d u Ruriunul Drug Policy: S,•rring 
.Ve''" !'riorirics. 1'JlJ-l L!. C t·IJ. LEG . F. I 7". (emph asiz in g the need to trc:lt the demand f,Jr dr ugs 
through aggre SS i\"C :llld i"L'Cusc d tre:Jtmcnt. education ancl preve ntio n pmgrams). 
Sl. ·rhc C ivi l Asset Forfeiture R~.Jurm Ac t proposes important proceclural changes 
(:1ppointment of coun se l. reasorwbk notice to property owners. increase in the governme nt 's 
b urden of proo f. etc.) bu t Joc s no t address a rea lloca tion of fo rfeiture fund s. Under pre ssure 
from the White H o use and the Dcp:ntme nt of .Justi ce . the C ivil Asset Fo rfeiture Re form r\ c t 
(!-l.R. 1835) was reworked and in troduced o n June !9. 1997 as H.R . 1965. The newly revise d bi ll 
a ttracted on lv three cosponsors (as opposed to 29 cosponsors on H .R. 1835) and has ga the red 
considerable opposit ion from p revio us sup po rte rs. such as th e ACL U and the N R r\. beca use it 
atte mpts to C'\pa nd the reach of fo rfe itu re law. S<:e Blume nso n & Ni lsen. supm note 32. a t !On 
n.273: Editoria l. A Burch~d Re{nmt . 0R;.c; c.;E COUNTY R EG ISTER. Octobe r 27 . !997. at 86. 
S2. On June ! 9. !997 the C ivil Asset Fo r fe itu re Rdo rm Ac t (H.R. 1'165) was referred to th e 
House Committees on Comm erce . Ways and Means and the judiciarY. The referral s to Co m -
mittccs on \Vavs and Mea ns and Curnmcrce \\" tre extenckcl fo r a pe riod tu end not lat e r tha n 
A ugust 7. !9lJS. 
S3. Sc~ C-\L. H E.-\LTH & S.-\FET Y CoDe.~ I l.\8l)( a)(2)(.-\) (\\'es t i 9lJ7). 
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common school funds of the state .'" Under Missouri's state constitution , 
forfeiture proceeds go to public schools ."
5 
Wisconsin , as welL uses some 
of its proceeds for the sta te school fund -"" New Jersey directed 10% and 
5% of forfe ited funds in the first two years, respectively, of the law 's ap-
plication to the H epatitis Inoculation fund ."
7 
Georgia authorizes some 
proceeds to go to victim-witness assistance programs and the representa-
tion of indigents in criminal casess" 
Pennsylvania is typical of many s t ates,'~ however, in that it directs that 
forfeited property or proceeds be utilized almost exclusively for law en-
forcement purposes.Yo In 1994. Pennsylvania amended its Controlled Sub-
stance Forfeiture Act to provide that " in appropriate cases, the district 
attorney and the attorney general may design ate proceeds from forfeited 
property to be utilized by community-based drug and crime figh ting pro-
grams and for relocation and protec tion of witn esses in criminal cases. "'" 
However, legislative history revea ls that th e only apparent purpose of 
this amendment was to clarify conflicting law enforcement inte rpreta-
tions of whether distr ict a ttorn eys were authorized to convey drug forfei-
ture funds to local D. A .R.E. proj ects.n Occas iona l news accounts revea l 
that only token grants are given to drug preve ntion groups by law en-
forcement authorities. T hese small amounts a re more likely intended to 
curry political fa vor than to make a meaningful impact on drug preven-
. q; 
t!On . . 
The nation may be in danger of los ing the war o n drugs .''" T he key to 
winning at least some decisive battles in the near future may hin ge upon 
the development of innovative and aggressive strategies that see k to sta-
bilize the high-poverty com muniti es most vict imized by drug activity and 
that offer intensive treatment, education and prevention services.'" In 
short, the demand for cl rugs must be curtailed. 
8-+. Sef [;o.;D. CO DE A N:\. * 11'i--+2-20-:i (e) (I) (West IY97). 
S5. i'v[O. Co;.;sT. an IX.~ 7. See. also . \ '10. A:-;N . ST.-'.T ~ 51 3 .623 (West 19Y1\) . 
86 . See \VJSC. STAT~ l)6 l. :i:i ( 1997). 
87 See NJ ST,\TAN\. S 2C:h4-6(~t) (\Vest 1995) 
i'i/\. Sec GA . CODE A ;o.;!'. ~ 16-!3-49 ( 1997). 
SY. See Blumcn so n & Nilsen. ,;upm note 32 . a t 52 n.6t1. 
90. Fo r fei ture funds arc to be usee\ fur the pu rposes of enforci ng the prm·is ions o f the s ta te 
Controlled Subs tance. Drug. DeY icc and Cosmetic Act. See -+ 2 P.-\. C'Oi'S STAT. A:-;1'. ~ 6SU1 (f) 
(West ]997). 
91. 42 PA. COi\S. STAT. ANN. ~ 68Ul(h ) (\Vest 19\17). 
lJ2 See Remarks of Re p. M. N . Wr ight on S.B. 313. Le gislative Journa l-House. Vol 111. 
Nov. 21. l 99-+. a t !9-+U. 
93. For example. a mini-grant o f 'i> 1.000 fro m se ized assets was a"·a rded to a high school 
anti-drug m ga nization. See \Vh itnev D. G ree r. Cnn{i.IDIIed Dmg /louse Offered .fin Sa le In 
!'uhlic. li\TELL ICEi\CER J OU RNAL. Lancaster. Pa .. June 20. 1 Y':!5 . at back page . 
'!-+ Sec. e.g .. John Ka\' e . f'rniden(s :Y!e.\Silge . 3 1 Mar. -Apr. PROSECUTOR 5 ( 1997) . 
05. See Heaps & Schwart z . . 'dlf} rn note XO. 
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Drug forfe iture proceeds on a!J levels can help fund this needed ap-
proach. Federal and state forfeiture allocation laws~'· sho uld be modified 
to provide that no less than fift y percent of all forfe ited fund s, net of 
moneys expended in providing court-appointed counsel to indigent prop-
erty owners, should be made available to es tablish special services dis-
tricts in high-poverty communities that are most adversely affected by 
drug activity. Special services districts have proven to be successful mod-
els for delivering intensi\Xe services to defined neighborhoods where tra-
ditional governmental services have enjoyed only minimal success."
7 
Usu-
ally, special districts are established in downtown business areas or in 
neighborhoods that are home to large, private institutions able to afford 
the additional revenues needed to fund special districts.ys For this reason, 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty have great difficulty es tablishing 
and supporting effective special services districts.~" 
However, forfeiture asset funds could hold the financial key to estab-
lishing joint public-private infrastructures tha t would allow the high-
poverty neighborhoods most victimized by drug activity to become spe-
cial services districts. Once es tablished, these districts could identify the 
intensive se rvices they believe to be most needed within their comm uni-
ties and then purchase those services from those non-profit organizations 
that have demonstra ted real success in serving low-income communities. 
Priority uses of forfeit ure asse t fund s, fo r example. might include general 
anti-poverty initiatives such as housi ng and community development. job 
96. State legislative re form will no t be effective so lung as federal adoption o f state fo rf.:i -
tures permit law enforceme nt a uthoritie s to bypass sta tes alloca tion req uire ments by 
.. fe deralizing .. local forfe itures. Legis la tive refo rm must occur at ~dl kve ls. Sc:e Blumenscln & 
N ilse n. supra no te 32. al II L 
'J7 . Spec ia l se rvi ce di stricts are orga nize d w pe rform speci fi ed gove rnmentctl functio ns and 
~tre ge nerallv governed bv a board of directors whic h possesses administrative imkpcndcncc 
from other unit s of gove rnment. Such district s have financial and reve nue powe rs and are gen -
e rall v se pa ra te corporate e ntiti es. See David J. Ke n ned\·. Res1ra ining file Pmn:r of Business lm -
f'I"<JV~ II lenl Disu"ic!s: The Cme of !he Grand Cen1ral Pannership . 15 Y.-\ LE L. & Po L· Y REV. 283. 
286 (lLJ96). While spec i<d se rvice di st ricts have enjuvcd cons iderable success . thev abo pre s•:nt 
unique challenges to in su re that thc y adhere to de mocratic pr inciples in clccision-111'tk ing. Sec id. 
at 32<J. 
98. For exa mple. a spec ia l serv ices district in Cente r C it y (do\\·nto\\·n) Ph i!Jde lphia ie,· ics a 
tax for its se rvices while a special serv ices di stric t in University Citv. Phil adelphia is pa id for bv 
voluntan· payme nts from such large institution s as the Uni·cers it y of Penrbvh·ani a. Drew ! Uni -
ve rsity. C hilclren·s H o>p ita l of Phila de lphia. AMTRAK. and the Un iversi tY C ity Sc ie nce C~n­
tcr. sc~ Edito ria l. Posifi l't' S!eps: Th e Ne tv Universitv Cill' [)is/rio is {-{;>/ping {II f?t'S /Ort' fill' 
Neighborl10od Feel uf Plliladclph ia. PHIL\. I NQu i R ER. N<J\·c mber 15. 19'37 . a t .'\ 1::>. 
99 . The Ce nter City special services distri ct has enjoyed consickrab le success in meeting it s 
ove rall obj ec tives. In re fl ecting upo n that success . State Representative Dwigh t Evam of Phil ~l ­
delphia stated in a town meet ing ... The ques tion I hear over and ove r again is: W h v can·t \\·e 
take that sa me knowledge (referring to the Cen te r Cit y d ist rict"s success in p roducing a s;·1fer 
do wntown area) and translate it to locations a li ove r the citv ., .. See Howard Gllodm an. Sn!u -
liom In Plliludelphia C ri111e Top Town Aleering , \ g cndll Celller Citv"s S ucuss is 1-~nv ied. Pltl L-\. 
l00L' IRER. Dec. 19. 19LJ7. at Bl. 
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crea tion, and free civil legal services to the poor, as \Veil as speci fic anti -
drug initi atives such as drug treatment, education and p revention serv-
ices. These efforts would be a imed a t stabili zing famili es , insuring ade -
quate housing an d educa tional opportunities, and offering young peop le 
productive alternatives to the attractions of the st reet. This infusion of 
much-needed cap ita l, managed a t the loca l level by responsive special 
services dist ricts, would help to reduce the dem and for drug use by 
stre ngthening neighborhoods a nd empowerin g be leaguered communities 
to take re al contro l over their own des tinies. If law enforcement agencies 
really want the civil forfe iture program to help them win the war on 
drugs, they must be willing to sha re the tools needed to ge t the job done . 
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